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 This appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social 
Security1 rejecting Herman Edelman's claim for social security benefits for the month of 
October 1993 presents the issue of the proper construction of the 1981 amendments to the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) affecting the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
301 et. seq. Because we determine that the district court correctly interpreted the 
statute and applicable regulations, and because Edelman cannot sustain his constitutional 
claim, we will affirm. 
 The parties have agreed that the facts are not in dispute, and the issue for 
determination is purely legal.  Herman Edelman turned sixty-two on October 3, 1993.  On 
October 23, 1993, he applied for early social security benefits.  The Social Security 
Commission informed him by letter on November 12 that he was entitled to such benefits as 
of November 1993, and began to pay him benefits.  Edelman appealed this determination, 
asserting that his entitlement should begin as of October 1993, and not November. 
 In December of 1993, the Assistant Regional Commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration affirmed the original finding, that Edelman's benefits began as of 
November.  Edelman requested reconsideration, which was denied.  The parties then 
stipulated to an expedited appeals process, and Edelman filed a civil action for 
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
The parties each moved for summary judgment, and Edelman also moved for class 
certification.  The district court, Judge Mary Little Parell, found that Section 202(a) of
the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) established the eligibility 
provisions for individuals seeking retirement benefits.  After the 1981 amendments by the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), the statute provided for retirement benefits to 
a sixty-five year old individual in the month "within" which he or she met all of the 
                     
1The complaint originally named Donna Shalala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
as defendant.  After Congressional action made the Commissioner the proper party, the 
caption was amended pursuant to Fed.R.App.Proc. 43. 
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eligibility requirements.  However, sixty-two year olds seeking early retirement benefits 
were entitled to receive them in the month "throughout" which the requirements were met.  
 Because of this difference in language, the court held that early retirement 
benefits did not begin until the first month in which an individual had been sixty-
during the entire month. Because Edelman did not turn sixty-two until the third of the 
month, he was not eligible for benefits in October of 1993. Consequently, the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and denied 
Edelman's two motions.   
 Summary judgment is proper when there are no material facts in dispute and judgment 
may be entered as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-32 (1986).  In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply 
this same test, and our review is plenary. Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie
853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq., provides old-age and pension 
benefits for persons who meet certain criteria specified in 42 U.S.C. § 402(a).  These 
criteria are as follows: 
Every individual who - 
(1) is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 414(a) of this title),
(2) has attained age 62, and 
(3) has filed application for old-age insurance benefits or was entitled to 
disability insurance benefits for the month preceding the month in which he 
attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(l) of this title, 
  shall be entitled to old-age insurance benefit for each month, beginning with 
(A) in the case of an individual who has attained retirement age (as defined in 
section 416(l) of this title), the first month in which such individual meets 
the criteria specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), or  
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained age 62, but has not attained 
retirement age (as defined in section 416(l) of this title), the first month 
throughout which such individual meets the criteria specified in paragraphs (1) 
and (2)(if in that month he meets the criterion specified in paragraph (3))...
42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(emphasis added).   
 Thus, beginning at age 62 a person is eligible for retirement benefits, but the 
language of the entitlement differs between early retirement (age 62 but not yet 
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retirement age) and retirement at age 65.  This difference was added by the 1981 
amendments to the Act contained in Section 2203(a) of Title XXII of the Omnibus Budget and 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). Prior to OBRA, the statute had provided that every 
individual who had met the three criteria would be entitled to old-age insurance benefits 
for the first month "in" which the individual became entitled.  In accordance with the 
1981 amendments, the Social Security Administration has promulgated rules to determine 
when benefits begin. 
 Section 404.311 of the Code of Federal Regulations, volume 20 provides that 65
olds are entitled to benefits beginning with the first month "in which" all requirements 
are met; persons who are 62 or older, but not yet 65 are entitled to benefits beginning 
the first month "throughout" which all requirements ar met.  This regulation is further 
explained in the Program Operations Manual System (POMS)2 § RS 00201.001: "A individual 
born on the first or second day of the month (attainment of age 62 on the last day of the 
preceding month or the first day of the current month) could be entitled to benefits for 
the month of his or her 62nd birthday.  Birth on any other day of the month would preclude 
entitlement for the month in which the birth occurs since the individual would not be age 
62 for the entire month." The Social Security Administration considers a person to have 
attained a certain age on the day before that birthday.  A person born on January 1, 1934, 
attained 62 on December 31, 1995.  Under these regulations, Edelman, whose birthday is 
October 3, attained the age of 62 on October 2, 1993.  Thus, he was not 62 years old 
throughout the month of October, and his benefits did not begin until November of that 
year. 
 The Social Security Administration argues that OBRA's amendments evince a clear 
intent on the part of Congress to limit early retirement benefits.  Although 65-year
                     
2POMS is the authorized means for issuing official Social Security policy and operating 
instructions.  POMS § AO 20002.001. These regulations do not have the force of law.  
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981). 
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are eligible for retirement benefits beginning the first month they became 65, 62-year
olds are not eligible until they have been 62 throughout a full month.  The distric
agreed with this construction of the statute and regulations.  Edelman argues that there 
is no such congressional intent, and that the Social Security Administration's 
construction of the statute is arbitrary, capricious and denies him equal protection.
 The first principle in determining the meaning of a statute is the plain language of 
that statute.  Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, that is conclusive.  
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp., 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995). In this 
case, the statute clearly distinguishes between the words "in which" and "throughout 
which."  We must assume that Congress, in enacting these amendments, intended them to have 
a real and substantial effect.  See, Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
S.Ct. 1537, 1545 (1995).  A change from "in" to "throughout" indicates that Congress 
wished to change its eligibility date from any time within the month of an individual's 
sixty-second birthday to the first month throughout which the individual was sixty-
The plain meaning of "throughout" is "from beginning to end."  The plain reading of the 
statute indicates that the Social Security's regulations are accurate in their 
interpretation. 
 This is borne out by the legislative history behind OBRA. The report to the House of 
Representatives noted that, under law prior to OBRA, beneficiaries were eligible to 
receive early retirement benefits for the whole month in which they became eligible, 
regardless of when in that month the eligibility occurred.  The report gave an example of 
a worker who turned 62 on June 15, and noted that under the old scheme, he would be 
eligible for a reduced benefit for June.  Under the amendments, however, "entitlement to 
benefits would begin with the first month throughout all of which the individual met all 
the requirements of eligibility.  In the example above, the first month of eligibility 
would be July...."  H.R.Rep. No. 97-158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 at 290 (1981).  This 
leaves no question as to the intent of Congress.  Because the challenged CFR and POMS 
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regulations promote this intent, they are "based on a permissible construction of the 
statute."  Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)(setting 
forth the appropriate standard of appellate review of agency regulations concerning a 
federal statute).  Therefore, they are not arbitrary and capricious. 
 The only issue remaining, therefore, is whether the statute itself comports with 
Constitutional requirements.  Edelman claims that it does not, because it establishes an 
arbitrary classification system based on the day of the month in which people were born, 
and then treats groups differently based on this classification, in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Under the statute as applied, persons born on the first or the second day of the 
month can receive benefits for the month in which they turn 62, while persons born on the 
third of the month or later do not receive old-age benefits until the following month.  
This is disparate treatment.  But disparate treatment is not necessarily unlawful 
discrimination.  In the area of social welfare, courts have recognized the need to make 
broad categorizations in order to administer such a large-scale entitlement.  Therefore, 
as long as Congress is not singling out a class we have recognized as suspect, or 
burdening a right we have upheld as fundamental, we tolerate some imperfections in the 
system.  Dillinger v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 506, 508 (3d Cir. 1985)(upholding 1979 
amendments changing the computation of "old age" under the Social Security Act).  The 
Constitution does not require complete precision from Congress in this area.  Rather, we 
hold that a statutory classification in the area of social welfare is consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause if it is "rationally based and free from invidious 
discrimination." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).  The statute at issue 
here meets these "rational basis" requirements. 
 Congress acted legitimately in attempting, with the 1981 OBRA, to limit government 
spending.  The method by which they chose to do so, to delay payment of early retirement 
benefits until an applicant had been 62 throughout an entire month, was rational.  It is 
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true that Congress could have acted with greater precision, and prorated a person's 
benefits based on their date of birth.  This, however, would have been more costly, and 
also complex and difficult to administer.  Congress is by no means so required.  With such 
a large fund to administer, and a large and growing number of persons to pay, the mere 
enormity of the task justifies Congress' decision to recognize changes in eligibility only 
at monthly intervals.  The classification established here is not invidious, and it is not
enough that plaintiff can argue another rational way for Congress to draw the line.  The 
district court committed no error in denying Edelman's motion for summary judgment and 
granting the Commissioner's motion.3 
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.  Each side to bear 
its own costs. 
 
 
 
                     
3
 Because we affirm the district court's dismissal of Edelman's complaint, we find it 
unnecessary, as did the district court, to reach the issue of his motion for class 
certification. 
 
